Collateral Damage: Votes, tricks and bullets

[Editor´s comment: This column, about the July 4 elections in Mexico, clearly describes the challenges that the current political and civil situation in the country presents to the development of democracy in Mexico.] 

 Original Spanish version at: Votos, trampas ybalas

José Antonio Crespo

July 2, 2010

What guarantees of cleanness, safety and validity can Sunday's election offer?  What options do citizens have?

While the assassination of Rodolfo Torre is a major setback to the fragile Mexican democracy, that democracy has already been systematically stuck by the political class. Before and after the tragedy, we saw a gallery of political pettiness from all parties and many levels of government. Ten years after the first democratic change in our history, we are now facing a scenario not unlike that which prevailed 20 years ago in electoral matters. We face authentic state elections where there are no minimum guarantees of fairness, transparency and impartiality, and there is direct use of public resources in favor of parties and official candidates. There is evidence that election  officials have been under the control of various parts of the Executive Branch. This prevents there being an adequate, minimum credibility in the electoral process.

Electoral confidence vanishes because of the illegal war between political parties nakedly fighting for political booty and control of the budget above all.

On the other hand, the drug trafficker reaches the same goal with the possibility of black money in campaigns, candidates accused of links with the cartels and, even worse, the increasing level of murders by hired assassins. The stings of the agitated wasps are greater each time, and each time fewer spaces in the national house are saved from the dangerous onslaught of political weddings. In the face of the electoral violence of the narcotraffickers and with elections being held in multiple states, what guarantees of cleanliness, safety and validity can the elections of Sunday have? What options do citizens have, facing all of this?

Not long ago, the Interior Minister, Fernando Gómez Mont, predicted that, beginning this month, we would see the level of violence go down. And to encourage voter participation in such difficult conditions, he said, "The State is there to protect them, to go out and vote, to fulfill their political duties." (May 25, 2010) Reality soon took charge, contradicting the Secretary, as much in regard to the decrease in violence as in the State's ability to protect citizens. 

If the State took a hand in the abduction of Diego Fernandez de Cevallos, if you cannot provide security for a presumptive governor, if you cannot care for the lives of your prisoners, if people trying to cure their drug addiction in rehabilitation centers are executed, if you cannot prevent a city like Monterrey from being strangled in its roadways by the drug traffickers, could we blame the citizens in the areas most affected by violence if they decided it is best not to take the risk? That already happened last year, as the cities hardest hit by the drug violence showed a very low rate of participation, such as Ciudad Juarez (27%), Acapulco (28%), Tijuana (29%), Nuevo Laredo Reynosa (36%), and Culiacán (37%). It may be possible that, at least in Tamaulipas the reaction of the electorate may be the opposite, to express their outrage and determination not to be swayed by organized crime by going to the polls in large numbers.

Both these reasons that impair democracy -- the lack of respect for the electoral law on the part of the parties, governors and candidates, as well as the insecurity derived from narcotrafficking -- affect the credibility of the electoral process and electoral enthusiasm. That "votes will always be more powerful than bullets" sounds fine, but those who have reduced the strength of voting have been the political class itself, rather than the drug trafficking. 

For this reason, due to the inability of the government at all levels to ensure the safety of the population and the growing rejection of the existing strategy, movements to vote "No" have emerged as a means of protest in Chihuahua. The same in Puebla, due to the unreliability of the process itself and the absence of a genuine conmmitment of the political class to the electorate.

A difficult crossroads confronts the voters next Sunday: vote for the opposition in order to move things towards a hopeful alternative, refrain for fear of bullets, cancel the vote because of lack of faith in the process or lack of conviincing alternatives, or go to the polls and vote for the party that may strengthen our increasingly fragile political institutions. It remains to be seen. 

The War on Drugs

Editor's comment: The following is excerpted from the U.S. State Department briefing of June 29, 2010, regarding the assassination of Dr. Rodolfo Torre Cantu, PRI candidate for governor in the State of Tamaulipas. It makes clear that the U.S. government is sticking by its guns, literally.


State Department Press Briefing, June 29, 2010.
Statement and questions regarding the assassination of Tamaulipas gubernatorial candidate  
MR. DUGUID: Thank you all for attending today. Welcome to the State Department. I have several announcements just before we begin. In the first, I would like to say that the United States is shocked and saddened by the brutal murders of Tamaulipas candidate Dr. Rodolfo Torre Cantu and his colleagues which occurred on June 28^th. We offer our condolences to the families and we offer our condolences to their supporters.


(after questions on other matters were addressed)
QUESTION: On Mexico, I would like to know, do you believe this is a serious setback to the efforts of Mexico and the U.S. to control the violence originated by the drug cartels? [editor's emphasis] Do you also believe this is maybe the steps that Colombia was following when they had a similar problem?

MR. DUGUID: What has happened is a tragedy and it is evidence that our fight against drug cartels and against criminal violence needs to continue, it needs to be strengthened, and we need to pursue it vigorously. The loss of any life is regretted and regrettable, but it is not a loss of our confidence that we can together as two nations defeat this violence.

QUESTION: But do you think this escalation of violence can maybe force to change the current strategy from --

MR. DUGUID: I think that in some cases, as it has been described to me, that a resulting uptick in the violence is a reaction to the success of the program. That isn’t to say that there isn’t much work to be done and certainly the protection of civilian life, innocent life, is something that programs that we share together must try and address. But I don’t see that we should change our strategy based on this particular incident. What we should (do) is strengthen and pursue our strategy vigorously.

QUESTION: Do you believe this is going to get worse before it gets better?

MR. DUGUID: I won’t speculate on where the course goes from this point.

The War on Drugs

Killing of Mexcian Governor Front-runner Stirs Concern for Democratic Process Rodolfo Torre, the front-runner in this weekend's gubernatorial election in the violence-plagued northern state of Tamaulipas, was ambushed and killed Monday. The slayings of Torre and four other people in his party underscored what analysts and officials on both sides of the border said was the pervasive influence of criminal organizations and their determination to decide who governs Mexico. ... A U.S. law enforcement intelligence official, speaking on the condition of anonymity, said the Torre killing represented the arrival of a darker and more imminent threat to Mexico in which politicians will increasingly be targeted. June 29, 2010, Dallas Morning News


Mexico´s Meth Warriors Mexico's newest drug cartel, and certainly the most bizarre, is La Familia Michoacana, a violent but Christian fundamentalist narco-gang based in the torrid Tierra Caliente region of western Michoacan state. The group is infamous for methamphetamine smuggling, lopping off enemies' heads and limbs, and massacring police and soldiers. ... La Familia is establishing a troubling new narco-business model: It doesn't merely buy off officials, it puts its own candidates in power. "Other cartels just pay off the political structure in order to be able to do their business," says a Michoacan investigator, who estimates the group controls 83 of the state's 113 municipal governments. "La Familia is making itself the political structure." June 28, 2010, Time


The New Cocaine Cowboys NY Times OpEd by Robert  C. Bonner, senior principal of the Sentinel Group and former administrator of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration under President George H.W. Bush from 1990 to 1993 and commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection under President George W. Bush from 2001 to 2005. 
In the last two decades, Mexican drug cartels have acquired unprecedented power to corrupt and intimidate. Three factors account for their rise: pre-existing corruption, the inability of weak law enforcement institutions to counter them, and the demand for illegal drugs in the United States. ... The situation in Mexico today, including the violence, is similar to the one that Colombia faced 20 years ago. ... There are several lessons to be drawn from Colombia’s successful campaign.

New Focus

The U.S. and Mexico are increasingly interdependent. Three critical issues are coming to dominate this interdependence:

• The War over Drugs
• Migration and the Border
• Globalization and Politics. 

The dynamics of these issues are changing almost daily. The Americas Program believes it is crucial to stay abreast of these developments.

Therefore, The Americas  MexicoBlog will now be providing current updates of news about each of them. 

International Delegation Issues Preliminary Findings on Pre-electoral Conditions in Colombia

The following is the preliminary statement of the International Pre-electoral Observation Mission, presented Feb. 15 to the Colombian press in Bogota. The Americas Program was privileged to form part of this Mission and participate in the extensive observations that took place over a period of two weeks prior to issuing the statement. The Mission is currently working on preparing the full report, due out next week before the scheduled Mar. 14 Congressional elections in Colombia.

STATEMENT TO THE PRESS

The International Pre-Electoral Observation Mission is an effort led by Global Exchange, a U.S. non-governmental organization, with the participation of professionals, analysts and citizens of more than seven countries including the United States, Canada, Germany, the U.K. and Mexico.

The mission is made up of 22 individuals with collective experience of electoral observation in eleven countries. From Feb. 3-15, the group conducted pre-electoral observation in Colombia, prior to the 2010 elections. We divided into four teams to observe conditions in municipalities in the departments of Antioquia, Córdoba, Valle del Cauca and Santander.

The objective of the mission is to compile reports from diverse sectors that form part of the electoral process, register the concerns of civil society and assess the actions of governmental institutions. These accounts were collected within a country context where internal displacement, violence and the presence of armed actors persists.

The team carried out an intensive schedule of training, in-field observation and research from Feb. 3-14. Its members interviewed governmental authorities in charge of electoral matters--the National Electoral Council, the National Civil Registry, local Attorney Generals, officials from the regional prosecutors' offices, local and states Human Rights Ombudsmen and mayor and state governors’ offices. We also met with representatives and candidates from the political parties, political analysts, Afro-Colombian and indigenous organizations, LGBT persons, youth groups, human rights defenders, journalists, organizations of internally displaced persons, victims of human rights abuses and trade union activists.

The mission’s final report will be available on March 10 prior to Colombia’s congressional elections. The goal is for the report to serve as a catalyst for the electoral authorities and civil society to investigate and take steps to minimize the electoral risk factors found in the report prior to the conclusion of Colombia´s 2010 elections.

Our international team had the support of the Electoral Observation Mission (MOE), at the national and regional level. The MOE has carried out the important work of identifying and systematizing electoral risks since 2006. As an independent entity and working in conjunction with MOE, our purpose is to strengthen democracy and generate conditions so that citizens can fully exercise their political rights in Colombia.

The International Pre-Electoral Observation Mission would like to share some preliminary findings that came to our attention during the visits we undertook to the different regions:

1. Human Rights Violations and Electoral Risks

The protection of human rights and effective justice in cases of violations are key to ensuring that voters can fully participate in a democracy in a transparent, free and informed manner. The mission encountered much evidence of an alarming human rights situation in the country and the existence of grave violations of the rights of residents we spoke to in Antioquia, Santander, Córdoba and Valle del Cauca. Violations were attributed to both legal and illegal armed groups, and drug-traffickers. We also found that levels of violence remain high, especially among vulnerable populations including youth, women, Afro-Colombians, indigenous, internally displaced, LGBT and poor people. In addition to selective assassinations, the mission was informed by different sources that the incidence of forced disappearances has been rising, presumably to avoid inflating the national murder statistics. This violence, and subsequent impunity in many of these cases, prevents citizens from trusting the authorities and lead many voters to decide against participating in the electoral process.

In certain regions like Barrancabermeja and Buenaventura, the mission was informed that despite an increase in police and military personnel on the ground, citizens do not have an overall sense of security and the homicide rate has been rising. Youth, indigenous people and Afro-descendants face stigmatization within society and are often branded “undesirables.” This creates a context of discrimination in which crimes against these sectors are often not fully investigated or prosecuted.

In various parts of the country, civil society organizations reported that supposedly demobilized paramilitary groups continue to act against the civilian population. They noted that an open strategy exists on the part of these groups to persecute leaders of Afro-Colombians, indigenous peoples, rural farmers, trade unionists and human rights defenders and their organizations. Those interviewed reported cases of selective assassinations, extrajudicial executions and forced disappearances among the leaders of these groups.

While officials claim that the paramilitary groups have demobilized, that they no longer exist and that drug-trafficking rings have been dismantled and now represent only isolated expressions of violence, civilian groups we spoke to in the regions expressed grave concerns about these groups’ continued presence and territorial control. Citizens reported that armed criminal groups are consolidating, a perception that is shared by some officials who work on these issues and who preferred to remain anonymous for fear of possible reprisals for their statements.

Internal displacement and confinement (the inability to move freely from their territories due to restrictions imposed by the legal and illegal armed groups) are two situations that the delegations found in all regions visited. Some local authorities expressed concern about how slow the national government was in recognizing the status of many internally displaced citizens and their lack of attention to this population. In addition to the trauma of being internally displaced, many of these people faced social stigmatization and are forced to confront many institutional obstacles to their rights to protection, humanitarian assistance and access to public services. Many interviewed noted that the period granted for the internally displaced to renew I.D. cards and register to vote was too short.

2. Fear and Restriction of Freedom of Expression

Fear is widely present in all spheres of Colombian society and serves as a factor that clearly inhibits Colombia’s free voting process and the ability to have open electoral debates. Individuals interviewed reported fear of reprisals if they voted for certain candidates, fear of traveling freely in certain geographical areas and fear of carrying out opposition campaigns.

Fear also exists among critical journalists seeking to do their job and exercise their right to inform the general public. Independent journalists brought to the team’s attention the fact that they have received threats against their lives and are put under pressure when they report electoral crimes.

Freedom of the press is further constrained by the political affinities of some media with certain political parties, which causes reporters who work for those entities to self-censor. This leads to unequal coverage of the campaigns.

3. The Presence of Electoral Crimes

Participation in political campaigning by public officials, prohibited under Colombia's Law of Guarantees, is one of the top concerns expressed by the different sectors consulted. Political parties and citizens reported that some mayors, governors and council members have openly participated in campaigning for candidates. This participation allegedly goes beyond expressing their political sympathies, and the Mission heard claims that campaign workers and publicity were being paid for through public funds, including through the issuance of temporary work contracts.

All of the political parties consulted said that the “other” parties or candidates were involved in buying votes, an electoral crime defined as such the Colombian penal code. This practice is so frequent that citizens colloquially call it “tula millonaria” or TLC (Spanish initials for tiles, bricks and cement), referring to the common practice of paying voters in kind for their votes.

To check if citizens voted for the agreed-on candidate, those who commit electoral fraud use methods such as carbon paper, or cell phone or digital camera photos to verify how a ballot was marked, as well as employing a method of rotating marked ballots known as the "carrousel".

According to community leaders and beneficiaries of the social programs run by the Colombian Agency for Social Action, candidates for the House and Senate have participated in meetings where beneficiaries were informed that if they do not vote for them or for the governing party, the subsidies they receive from the president’s office will be terminated. We consider it of serious concern that there is no distinction made between the figure of the president and basic programs that are designed to attend to the needs of displaced populations and vulnerable families in the country.

4. Distance between Citizen Complaints and Actions Taken by Officials

We note that there have been advances in electoral norms and regulations that will permit the strengthening of the electoral process. However, there is a huge distance between the views of the local populations and those of the local authorities. While many people and all the political parties informed us that the practice of buying votes with cash or in kind payments is widespread, and numerous cases of voter coercion exist, local authorities state that they have not received complaints of electoral fraud.

This situation indicates that there is a rupture between the formal aspects of the society represented in Colombian institutions and the daily reality for the general public. It also shows the lack of confidence that civilians have in their authorities, which impedes official reporting of electoral crimes.

We found it troubling that many people affirmed that the main reasons for why they do not report crimes are due to fear and impunity. Democracy is not limited to elections but to the confidence that exists between citizens and their officials. This must be built on clear rules of engagement, transparency, impartiality and coherence between the mandates of the institutions and their practices.

Final Considerations

The International Pre-electoral Observation Mission considers the tradition of participation in Colombia to be very important. We noted in our observation in the different regions of the country that Colombians have a strong capacity to organize and engage in civic actions in areas of defense and promotion of human rights, participation in the planning and exercise of local budgets, implementation of community projects and collective action on a wide range of issues. However, persistent distrust of the electoral process and the lack of basic guarantees means that the work of civic education and elections monitoring is still incipient.

In this sense, the Mission considers that the work being done by various citizen groups in electoral observation forms part of political processes that seek to change corrupt practices; this requires developing a closer relationship to the citizenry and greater commitment in the exercise of power.

The Mission considers it vitally important that authorities take decisive steps against electoral crimes, in particular to pursue the continued existence of “electoral frontmen”, where questionable political organizations seek to continue to operate by changing the names of political parties or supporting candidacies of family members. While such practices are not illegal, they generate a sense of illegitimacy in the democratic process and run the risk that the Congress elected could be investigated and subject to legal proceedings that greatly affect the legitimacy and credibility of the current legislature.

The final report will include our full recommendations and observations. The mission, however, would like to preliminarily highlight the need for governmental authorities to strengthen the work of regulating, applying and monitoring electoral regulations. Authorities report a lack of resources to be able to implement their mandates. We also believe that it is urgently important that steps are taken to eliminate the possibility of fraud and coercion of voters, practices that continue to exist, according to the accounts we received.

The strengthening of democracy and the construction of electoral processes that reap the benefits of having the full confidence of the citizenry are only possible if Colombian society opens spaces for dialogue and transparency, ends impunity, and eliminates current practices of exclusion and concentration of wealth and power. The current challenges for Colombian democracy range from more effective control of the electoral process, to resolving much deeper problems in society, including the internal armed conflict, violence, intimidation, discrimination and corruption.

The mission wishes to thank all of the civil society leaders, citizens, officials and local authorities for the constant support of our activities, and the strong commitment to democracy evident in many sectors of Colombia, despite situations that jeopardize the full exercise of liberty and fundamental human rights. For all the people who maintain the hope that it is possible to bring about the changes that our societies need, we offer our solidarity. We believe, as they do, that all change requires time, as well as collective, determined action over the long term. It is this type of important work that thousands of Colombians are already undertaking in their country.

Many thanks.

International Pre-electoral Observation Mission

Bogotá, Colombia, Feb. 15, 2010.

Morales in Mexico

It was a hot afternoon in central Coyoacán and the sun beat down heavily on the crowd as they awaited the appearance of charismatic Bolivian leader, Evo Morales. The public queued patiently and edged slowly into the Jardín Hidalgo, following mandatory security checks that are the norm at events of this nature. As the area filled, the more eager of the spectators began to climb onto the bandstand, trees and fences, to get a glimpse of their hero. The smaller members of the audience stood on their tiptoes in preparation for the Bolivian leader’s arrival. A scuffle broke out in the crowd, and the two perpetrators were comically berated by onlookers who reminded them that, “We are socialists, not neocons! Keep the peace.” To warm up the crowd, an M.C. read out some of Evo’s achievements since he began his presidency in 2006. Evo Morales has made Bolivia a literate nation. In 2008, during the financial crisis, Bolivia’s GDP increased by 6%. Evo has successfully nationalized the nation’s gas reserves. He also intermittently entered the stage to give updates on Evo’s whereabouts. “He’s leaving the airport now!” Cheers from the crowd. “His car’s just arrived!” Cheers again. “He’s making his way through the crowd! Yet more cheers.

The crowd erupted as Morales took to the stage and began his speech. He greeted the crowd in Spanish and then in his native indigenous tongue. He expressed surprise at the size of the crowd, commenting that he thought he could only pull a crowd that size in Bolivia. He then apologized for not previously visiting Mexico, saying that he had to concentrate on governing his own country and gaining re-election.

Morales then instructed the crowd on how to match his achievements and earn respect for indigenous people. The president said it was important to move from mere resistance to the taking of power. The first step involves a “fight against all enemies – internal and external.” Step two entails uniting the Left – communists, socialists, etc. – under one banner. The third and final step involves self-belief—believing that you can become a political force.

He then moved on to talk about the Left’s bête noire – the rich. He told the cheering crowd that “basic services are public services and must not be privatized.” The crowd responded by chanting “Calderón out!” recalling their own president’s recent decision to dismiss over 40,000 employees of the state electricity company for the purposes of privatization. Morales’ attack on the upper class continued as he told the crowd that, “There are more of us than these modern millionaires. They have all the wealth but are small in number, whereas we are poor but are the majority.” He told the crowd that these gold-diggers were only interested in exploiting natural resources for their personal financial gain. The crowd listened as Morales spoke of the importance of getting middle-class citizens and intellectuals on side, to fight the oligarchs. Morales spoke of how he had no fear when he nationalized Bolivia’s resources, and he applauded the armed forces for their support during this time. Despite the fear-mongering of many international economists, the president’s policy was vindicated when Bolivia had it first fiscal surplus since 1940.

Morales then spoke of the weight of responsibility that he felt upon becoming president. He told the crowd of the difficulties of being the first indigenous president, candidly revealing that, “I was scared.” Nevertheless, Morales overcame his fear and turned his country from a “wretched and impoverished” nation to a modern state admired by many.

The president then turned his attention to the U.S. He lambasted the U.S. government for its role in the Honduran coup, calling it an “open conspiracy” and chastising the country for failing to end the debacle and reinstate Zelaya. He reminded his audience that there was “a permanent fight against imperialist intervention.” He recounted a story from early in his career, when he was a trade union leader in Cochabamba. There was a U.S. military base in his native city, which was used exclusively by the U.S. ambassador. A locally-elected leader made the mistake of trying to use the airport, but was told by U.S. officials that he needed permission. “Now Comrade Lula uses that airport, and so does Comrade Chavez!” he shouted defiantly, as the crowd reacted rapturously.

To end his speech, the president spoke of the dangers facing the world because of climate change. He invited members of alternative social movements to lobby their politicians and attend his alternative summit on climate change, scheduled for April. Morales told Mexicans that it was up to them to change their country and that this week could be historic. The Rio Group summit, which unites all the Latin American and Caribbean nations and takes place this week in Cancun, has been seen by many leaders as an opportunity to break free from U.S. dominance. “And in what better place would this happen than in the land of Benito Juárez and Emiliano Zapato!” Morales proclaimed, name-checking two heroes from Mexican folklore. His final words struck a note of optimism for the crowd, “Soon Mexico will be free.” As the crowd dispersed into the cool Coyoacán night, many hoped that these words foreshadow better times and that Mexico will share the same fortune currently experienced by their Bolivian brothers.

Michael Collins, February 2010

Ciudad Juárez Descends into Another Circle of Hell

El Paso's troubled twin, Ciudad Juárez, descended into another circle of hell this weekend when hitmen opened fire on a house where teenagers were celebrating a football victory. As of today, sixteen people--mostly youth--have died on the scene or from wounds in the hospital. The community is stunned, the nation shocked, and the phone ringing off the hook with calls from media.

International media have been once again drawn by the images of blood-soaked floors and weeping families, to make the sporadic foray across the border into Cuidad Juarez's morass of violence. The city now holds the world record in homicides per capita, with 2,600 killings last year alone. 2010 stands to be the bloodiest year yet, with 227 assassinations related to organized crime in January alone.

Ciudad Juárez is not only the most violent city in the country, it is also the most militarized. Operation Chihuahua was supposed to be the showcase of President Calderón's "war on drugs". Instead it has become the tragic evidence of a dead-end strategy.

Local residents interviewed in the aftermath of the tragedy called the security forces "useless". Fearing to give their names, they noted that the seven SUVs of heavily armed gunmen entered the neighborhood, hunted down the victims and left after looting the residence, reportedly passing right by a group of soldiers in the vicinity.

“We heard a lot of shots, at first we thought they were bottle rockets, but later we heard the running and the cries of the young girls that were at the party. Then came silence and a strong odor of gunpowder," a witness was reported as saying. Residents say even ten hours after the murders, the crime scene had not been secured.

So far, no-one knows the motive of the crime. The Washington Post reported that Ciudad Juarez mayor Jose Reyes put forward the preposterous hypothesis that the hit was "random."

"There is no logical explanation, a concrete reason for this event. This is something that worries us, gratuitous or random criminal acts," Reyes told MVS Radio. "It goes way beyond what had been happening and puts Ciudad Juarez in even greater danger."

The gunmen arrived in a highly organized commando unit, sporting machine guns. Although undoubtedly innocent people were killed, there is some reason the house was targeted and if experience is any guide we may never know what it was.

One of the students in the house was reportedly a witness recently in a multiple homicide trial involving organized crime. If this is indeed the reason behind the massacre, it raises serious questions about the protection of people who step forward to give information to the authorities.

The Mexican Congress has called for the Secretaries of Defense, the Navy and Public Security, along with the Attorney General to explain their security strategy in the border city and its spectacular failure in light of the most recent killings.

The massacre comes just days after U.S. Ambassador to Mexico Carlos Pascual praised a new strategy in Ciudad Juarez to replace army troops with federal police. "What the government has done now is an intelligent measure to introduce the federal police, which has all the legal capacities, and put them on the front line in the war on against drug-traffickers," he told the Mexican press.

The attack raises questions about the new strategy, which is really a facelift of the old strategy. Experts like General Francisco Gallardo of the Mexican Armed forces, now a human rights leader, note that the difference between the armed forces and the police is often just a change of uniform. Although some groups in Washington have insisted that a shift from army to police represents a major improvement in the drug war strategy, this incident indicates that the violence and impunity of organized crime will continue unabated.

The root problem lies in the militarized enforcement focus of the drug war, supported by the U.S. government through the Merida Initiative. Reduction of demand for illicit drugs, treatment and prevention of addictions, and a concerted attack on the financial structure of organized crime have nearly fallen off the policy map under the current plan.

A story in the Mexican daily El Universal notes that 70% of Merida resources remain in the United States, doled out in contracts for military equipment and intelligence equipment.

As companies like Northrop, Dyncorp and Blackhawk make millions on continuing the war on drugs south of the border, the violence is spiraling out of control.